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RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT FOR PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES TO OBTAIN A PARDON HELD UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST
PUBLIC POLICY
Plaintiff, seeking to obtain his brother's release from prison, engaged
an attorney to argue the case in pardon proceedings. A $5000 fee was paid
in advance with the alleged understanding that it would be refunded if
release was not granted by a specified date. The attorney was successful
in his argument before the pardon board and plaintiff's brother was freed,
but not until after the appointed date inasmuch as the requisite approval
of the governor was delayed. In a suit against the attorney's estate to
recover the advance, plaintiff won a jury verdict despite the defense that
the oral contract was without condition. On appeal, defendant contended
that the contingent fee contract was against public policy and that no action
could be founded upon it. Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
agreed that the contract was unenforceable, refund was nevertheless per-
mitted on the ground that the parties were not in pari delicto. Peyton v.
Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 156 A.2d 865 (1959).1
Contingent fee contracts, though viewed with disfavor and therefore
subjected to close scrutiny,2 are usually accepted both by courts 3 and under
existing standards of professional ethics 4 Where, however, the object of
1 Justices Bell and McBride concurred on the ground that the amount of the
fee was unreasonable.
2 See, e.g., Gruskay v. Simenauskas, 107 Conn. 380, 140 Atl. 724 (1928). See
also PA. R. Civ. P. 202; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS XIII.
3 United States ex tel. Payne v. Call, 287 Fed. 520 (5th Cir. 1923); Kimball
v. Casey, 169 Ga. 631, 151 S.E. 372 (1929) ; Parker v. Fryberger, 171 Minn. 384, 214
N.W. 276 (1927) ; Perry v. Dicken, 105 Pa. 83 (1884) ; Patten v. Wilson, 34 Pa. 299
(1859); cf. Hardman v. Brown, 153 Wash. 85, 279 Pac. 91 (1929).
4 See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS XIII. But see MASS. BAR Ass'N
CANON XIII. See also CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 56 (1915);
DRINKER, LEGAL ETmICS 176 (1953); SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 97-107 (2d
ed. 1860); Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 CALIF. L. Rv. 587 (1940); 20
OHIO ST. LJ. 329 (1959) ; 33 A.B.A. REP. 61-85 (1908). Areas in which contingent
fees are questionable at best are divorce cases and criminal prosecutions. Today,
attorneys' fees in divorce cases are frequently regulated by statute. E.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 65.16 (Supp. 1959) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 16 (Smith-Hurd 1956) ; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 1276 (1937) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (1955). It is gen-
erally accepted that contingent fee agreements to procure settlement or discharge of
a criminal prosecution, to aid in the prosecution of a criminal case, or to compound
an offense are invalid. See Baca v. Padilla, 26 N.M. 223, 190 Pac. 730 (1920);
Ormerod v. Dearman, 100 Pa. 561 (1882). See also 6 CoRnIN, CONTRACTS § 1421
(1951) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1718 (rev. ed. 1938). It has also been maintained,
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 542(2) (1932), that contingent fee contracts to defend
a criminal case are void, but the annotators for the Restatement have cited no cases
to support this proposition (nor has this writer been able to discover any so holding).
The ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS XIII permits contingent fees and has
been interpreted by some writers as applying to criminal cases. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 177 (1953). Thus it would seem that the practice is ethically proper but
unlitigated.
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such a contract is governmental action,5 the courts, rather than merely
proctoring the attorney-client relationship, have assessed the tendency of
the contract in the light of its consistency with public policy: where the
opportunity for impropriety is substantial, mere contingency alone will
render the contract void." And while the United States Supreme Court has
stated that the public interest demands that all contingent fee contracts to
obtain governmental action be unenforceable whether or not evidence of
improper or illegal means is adduced,7 it has not consistently applied this
principle but rather seems to have measured, in each case, the possibility
of improper action. Contingent contracts have thus been upheld, in the
absence of "any taint of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfairness," 8 where
the contingency on which the contract is based is governmental action of an
adjudicatory nature,9 but have been invalidated where their object was, for
instance, the passage of legislation. 10 On the other hand, Pennsylvania's
courts, in allowing agreements contingent upon the procurement of a con-
5 Governmental action as used herein refers to any exercise of a sovereign's
power by any of its branches or agents. Included, for example, are appointment by
the executive to public office, exercise of the pardon, commutative or clemency powers,
promulgation of statutory or administrative orders, administration of criminal justice,
and the granting of contracts and public benefits. See cases cited notes 9-12, 34
infra. The term does not include civil litigation, in which the participants are usually
private individuals and where the general public interest is only tangentially involved.
The fact that the government may be a party is immaterial; a contingent fee contract
whereby an attorney represented a municipality against the state has been upheld.
Williams v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 282, 57 Atl. 578 (1904).
6 Compare Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U.S. 71 (1906) (contingent fee to obtain
legislation to effect a sale to the government held invalid) ; Nutt v. Knut, 200 U.S. 12
(1906) (contingent fee where claim satisfied by private legislation held invalid);
Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45 (1864) (contingent fee to obtain a govern-
ment contract held invalid); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.)
314 (1853) (contingent fee to obtain legislation held invalid), with Taylor v. Bemiss,
110 U.S. 42 (1883) (contingent fee to prosecute claim against the government before
commission held valid); Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548 (1876) (contingent fee
to prosecute claim before executive department held valid); Wright v. Tebbitts, 91
U.S. 252 (1875) (contingent fee to prosecute claim before a commission held valid).
In Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 450 (1874) (dictum), the Court said that
there was no doubt that a contingent fee contract for purely professional services
would be enforceable. And in Wylie v. Coxe, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 415 (1853), the
Court enforced a contract which provided for compensation of 5% of the sum recovered
on a claim against Mexico without discussing the public policy aspects. In Townsend
& Fletcher, Contingent Fees in Procurement of Government Contracts, 11 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 37, 41 (1942), it is suggested that, in the government contract area, there
may be a distinction between a "contingent fee" and a "commission" This rather
formalistic distinction is irrelevant today, inasmuch as contracts with the federal
government are now controlled by Exec. Order No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941).
See generally 7 CORNELL L.Q. 361 (1922).
7 Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45 (1864). There is general agreement
that any contract to obtain governmental action founded upon a promise to accomplish
the desired end by use of personal influence or other illegal or improper means is void.
See 6 CoBiN, CONTRACTS § 1447 (1951) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1727 (rev. ed.
1938). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 559 (1932).
8 Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 557 (1876).
9 See Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42 (1883) ; Stanton v. Embrey, supra note 8;
Wright v. Tebbitts, 91 U.S. 252 (1875).
10 See Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U.S. 71 (1906); Nutt v. Knut, 200 U.S. 12
(1906); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
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tract with the government 11 but generally refusing to sanction contingency
in other areas of governmental action,12 either reject or refuse to recognize
any distinction between adjudicatory and other functions of government.
The Pennsylvania view seems paradoxical in that the opportunity for im-
proper influence in the award of contracts seems substantial.
In the instant case, the court, neither examining the situation before
it in the light of the opportunity presented for undue influence nor taking
cognizance of a recent lower court trend upholding contracts where con-
tingent payment is for purely professional services,13 resurrected instead
three cases from the cobwebs of antiquity and unquestioningly followed
them.14 These cases, however, do not merit the reliance placed upon them.
The first, Hatzfield v. Gulden,15 while indeed denying validity to a con-
tingent fee contract to secure a pardon, arose in 1838 and varies significantly
from the instant case in several respects. First, 1959 pardon procedures
differ markedly from those of 1838: today the pardon power, constitu-
tionally vested in the governor,16 may be exercised only upon the recom-
mendation of the Board of Pardons '7 made "after full hearing, upon due
public notice and in open session," and the reasons for such recommendation
must be stated at length.'8 Opposed to this is the unregulated procedure
of public petition described in Hatzfield.19 Furthermore, mass circulation
" O'Hara v. J. W. Rex Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 191 (C.P. 1958); cf. Warnock v.
Philadelphia Trust Co., 69 Pa. Super. 589 (1918); Abrahams v. Epstein, 69 Pa. D.
& C. 238 (C.P. 1949) (right to conduct a business).
12 Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa. 375, 24 Atl. 219 (1892) (legislation); Bowman v.
Coffroth, 59 Pa. 19 (1868) (discharge from draft); Filson's Trustees v. Himes, 5
Pa. 452 (1846) (appointment to public office); Clippinger v. Hepbaugb, 5 W. & S.
315 (Pa. 1843) (legislation); Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts 152 (Pa. 1838) (pardon).
But see Hosack v. Taylor Bros., 142 Pa. Super. 83, 15 A.2d 489 (1940), where a
contingent fee contract to secure a tax reassessment was enforced in the absence of
proof that anything improper was done or contemplated. This case seems irrecon-
cilable with the law reasserted in the instant case.
I3 Hosack v Taylor Bros., supra note 12; Warnock v. Philadelphia Trust Co.,
69 Pa. Super. 589 (1918); O'Hara v. J. W. Rex Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 191 (C.P.
1958); Abrahams v. Epstein, 69 Pa. D. & C. 238 (C.P. 1949).
14 Bowman v. Coffroth, 59 Pa. 19 (1868) ; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S.
315 (Pa. 1843) ; Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts 152 (Pa. 1838).
15 7 Watts 152 (Pa. 1838).
16 A pardon is considered an act of grace which only the governor has power to
grant. Although he cannot exercise this power except upon a recommendation by
the Board of Pardons, he is not bound by the Board's affirmative recommendation.
See PA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 9; Wolfgang, Analysis of Selected Aspects of the Board
of Pardons, 39 PRISON J. 8 (1959). There are six basic situations in which petitions
for pardon or commutation may be made: (1) where there has been an erroneous
conviction; (2) where although error cannot be proved there exists serious doubt
as to guilt or the propriety of the trial; (3) to correct an inequitably severe sentence;
(4) where, after the complete sentence has been served, termination of the collateral
legal consequences of a criminal conviction and restoration of civil rights is sought;
(5) group pardons to a class of offenders; and (6) death cases. Foote, Pardon Policy
it a Modern State, 39 PRIsoN J. 3 (1959).
1 7 PA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 9. The Board of Pardons is comprised of the Lieutenant
Governor, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the Attorney General and the Secre-
tary of Internal Affairs.
18 Ibid.
19 7 Watts at 153.
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newspapers have increased public awareness of the machinations of the
modern pardon board and, as a consequence of its living in the proverbial
goldfish bowl, the danger of undetected devious practices has been greatly
diminished.2 0  Second, it must be noted that in Hatzfield the recipient of the
contingent fee was a layman, 2 1 engaged to solicit signatures to be placed on
a petition to the governor, whereas in the instant case the recipient was an
attorney employed in his professional capacity to represent the prisoner
before the Board of Pardons. Third, the Hatsfield court stressed the pos-
sibility that the governor might be deceived by a petition presented by
persons apparently motivated by a sense of injustice done when in reality
their motives were mercenary.22  In contrast, the modern pardon board is
obviously cognizant that the attorney before them is appearing as an ad-
vocate; even the fee which the attorney is paid must be disclosed in the
petition.2  These three factors-regularized procedure, payment for pro-
fessional services, and known status of attorney as advocate-suffice to
disperse the fears of undue influence which led the Hatzjield court to declare
such contingent contracts invalid per se.
2 4
The court in the instant case used the second authority on which it
relied, Clippinger v. Hepbaugh,25 by analogy. There, a contingent fee
contract to procure the passage of private legislation was struck down as
against public policy regardless of whether improper means such as personal
or sinister influence were used or contemplated.2 6  The Clippinger court
20 See articles in the Philadelphia Inquirer, May 30, 1959, p. 1, col. 1; May 23,
1959, p. 13, col. 1; May 22, 1959, p. 31, col. 1; May 14, 1959, p. 1, col. 8; April 10,
1959, p. 1, col. 8; April 3, 1959, p. 1, col. 1; March 6, 1959, p. 31, col. 6; Jan. 30, 1959,
p. 4, col. 3; and in the Philadelphia Bulletin, Nov. 10, 1959, p. 91, col. 5; June 28, 1959,
p. 1, col. 4; June 11, 1959, p. 1, col. 5; Feb. 1, 1959, p. B1, col. 1.
2 1 The fact that the recipient was a layman would be significant in at least two
jurisdictions, which specifically disparage contingent contracts whereby laymen per-
form other than nonprofessional services. See Chippewa Val. & Sup. Ry. v. Chicago,
S.P., Minn. & 0. Ry., 73 Wis. 224, 250, 44 N.W. 17, 24 (1889) ; Bremsen v. Engler,
17 Jones & Spen. 172, 175-76 (N.Y.C. Super. Ct. 1833) (dictum).
22 See Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts 152, 155 (Pa. 1838). The particular danger
sought to be avoided is that the governor will, not knowing that the person to whom
he listens is an interested party, give the same credence to the paid agent's appeal
which that of an impartial person would deserve.
23 Instant case at 96, 156 A.2d at 870 (concurring opinion). This procedure may
protect a prisoner whose attorney claims but does not possess influence, but it may
not go far enough to guard the public against an attorney who does possess influence
and employs it in obtaining undeserved pardons for his clients. Obviously the person
with influence will not be the one whose fee is questioned by the Board.
24 Two English cases, Waymell v. Reed, 5 T.R. 599, 101 Eng. Rep. 335 (K.B.
1794), and Clugas v. Penaluna, 4 T.R. 466, 100 Eng. Rep. 1122 (K.B. 1791), cited by
Hatzfield as examples of the type of contract which is unenforceable, actually stand
for the thesis that any contract made with a view toward evading the law is immoral
and unenforceable, even though under the particular circumstances it may not be
illegal.
25 5 W. & S. 315 (Pa. 1843).
26 The rationale of Clippinger was clearly expressed in the opinion: "It matters
not that nothing improper was done or was expected to be done . . . . It is enough
that such is the tendency of the contract, that it is contrary to sound morality and
public policy, leading necessarily, in the hands of designing and corrupt men, to im-
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noted that the process of passing private legislation was subject to personal
influence,2 7 that such influence was often present in fact, and that neither the
legislators nor the public took any significant interest in the desirability of
private legislation.28  The differences between Clippinger and the instant
case are immediately obvious: contrasted to the log-rolling procedure of
private legislation is the open and regular hearing of the pardon board,29
and aligned against the unconcerned and uninterested vote of the legislator
is the reasoned and written recommendation of the board.30 Even con-
ceding, then, that the procedures of the legislature are such as to require
the invalidation of contingent contracts in that area, the court's analogy
hardly seems apt.
As a third ground supporting its decision, the court analogized to a
case in which a contingent fee contract to procure a discharge from the
draft was held unenforceable. While it is true that this comparison is
plausible, Bowman v. Coffroth 31 was practically a blind adherence to the
Clippinger proposition 32 and, therefore, is rather weak as independent
authority for the instant case.
Had the court paused to appraise the facts before it in the light of
both the possibility of undue influence and the utility of contingent fee
contracts where pardons are sought, a result more in accord with the
liberal view, advocated by the Restatement of Contracts33 and subscribed
proper tampering with members, and the use of an extraneous, secret influence over
an important branch of the government. It may not corrupt all; but if it corrupts
or tends to corrupt some, or if it deceives or tends to deceive or mislead some, that
is sufficient [to make it against public policy]. . . ." Id. at 321. Although the
instant case cites Clippinger, for some reason it cites a portion of the opinion, 5 W.
& S. at 321, which seems to be inconsistent with its own holding. The Peyton court also
cites RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 542, 561 (1932). Unless obtaining a pardon comes
within "a bargain to conduct a criminal case," § 542 is contrary to the Peyton holding,
as is § 561. These citations shed doubt on whether the court is certain that all such
contracts are per se void and on whether the court is so holding. But the citation
of Hatsfield, the concurring opinion, and the second half of the majority opinion-
beginning with the citation of Bowman v. Coffrotl--all indicate that the majority is
making a sweeping condemnation of all such contingent contracts.
27 5 W. & S. 315, 320 (Pa. 1843).
28 The court also points out that often the legislature's only source of information
concerning a private bill is the party seeking to have the bill enacted. 5 W. & S.
at 319.
29 See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
30 PA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 9 requires the Board of Pardons to make a written recom-
mendation.
31 59 Pa. 19 (1868). This case regarded the fact that the contract was contingent
as immaterial, although acknowledging that in Clippinger Judge Rogers stated other-
wise. Id. at 23.
3 2 Bowzman based its decision on Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16
How.) 314 (1853) (legislation); Filson's Trustees v. Himes, 5 Pa. 452 (1846)
(contract contingent upon securing a government appointment) ; Clippinger v. Hep-
baugh, 5 W. & S. 315 (Pa. 1843) (legislation) ; and Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts
152 (Pa. 1838) (pardon).
33 RESTATEMFNT, CONTRACTS §§ 542(2), 559-63 (1932). The Restatement would,
absent proof of actual corrupt practices, allow enforcement of contingent fee contracts
in most cases. See note 4 supra.
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to by several states,3 4 might have been reached. The desirability of con-
tingent fee contracts in any area has been the focus of much debate.3 5 The
most plausible reason for allowing them is necessity 3q-making it possible
for a deserving claimant to secure representation; 3 this justification is
obviously weakest where the client is able to pay a retainer.38  Cogent
argument in opposition is based on the possible effect a contingent contract
may have upon the attorney's conduct. And while it cannot be assumed
that attorneys as a class are dishonest-analyses preoccupied with "tempta-
tion" 39 seem to be little more than makeweights-the conscious integrity
of an attorney may not be enough to protect his client when, through the
device of a contingent fee contract, a direct pecuniary interest may cause
him to favor subconsciously an outcome which is to his, rather than to
his client's, best interests.
40
What reasoning justifies enforcement of contingent fees in tort cases
but not where the object of the contract is the exercise of the pardon power?
In order to make a meaningful comparison, it must be assumed that in
each instance there is a deserving claimant, that the fee contracted for is
reasonable, and that the attorney-client relationship, in all its conscious
elements, meets the highest ethical standards. In both situations the
temptation to the attorney is the same-each stands to gain monetarily
by forsaking ethics and seeking to use undue personal influence. An argu-
ment that contingent fees will debase the profession in the eyes of the
public 41 cannot be applicable to one and not to the other. While one case
is tried before a court and the other argued before an administrative board,
this is a distinction without a difference unless the unsupported assumption
is made that the executive branch of the government is less honest than the
judicial, or that the former's safeguards against corruption are less effec-
3 4 E.g., Lewy v. Standard Plunger Elevator Co., 296 Ili. 295, 129 N.E. 775 (1921)
(contract); McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kan. 692 (1879) (legislation); Kerr v.
American Pneumatic Serv. Co., 188 Mass. 27, 73 N.E. 857 (1905) (contract); Stroe-
mer v. Van Orsdel, 74 Neb. 132, 103 N.W. 1053 (1905), aff'd on rehearing, 74 Neb.
143, 107 N.W. 125 (1906) (legislation).
35 See CARTE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 56-58; SHARSWOOD, PROrESsioxAL ETHICS
97-107 (2d ed. 1860) ; Radin, supra note 4; 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 329 (1959).
3 6 It has been held in other settings that necessity will sometimes justify risking
a conflict of interest. Where there exists no other tribunal competent to hear a case,
the courts will not require disqualification even upon a showing of judicial bias. See,
e.g., Jeffersonian Pub. Co. v. Hilliard, 105 Ala. 576, 17 So. 112 (1895); Moran v.
School Comm., 317 Mass. 591, 59 N.E.2d 279 (1945); Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5
Mass. 90 (1809); Philadelphia v. Fox. 64 Pa. 169 (1870). Cf. In re Battani, 6 F.
Supp. 376 (E.D. Mich. 1934). But cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (trial
before official who had direct pecuniary interest in conviction held to violate due
process of law).
37 Radin, mspra note 4, at 589.
38 See generally 20 OHIo ST. LJ. 329 (1959).
39 See SHARSWooD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 106 (2d ed. 1860); SMITH, JusTIcE
AND THE POOR 86-87 (1919).
40 SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 104 (2d ed. 1860).
41 SMITH, op. cit. supra note 39, at 86-87.
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tive.42  And the activities of the attorney in both situations create a fund
from which he may be paid 4 3-in the tort case directly by securing the
recovery and in the pardon case indirectly by freeing both the prisoner and
his earning capacity from the unremunerative confines of the penitentiary.
Significant differences between contingent fees in pardon cases and
those in tort cases arise in only two areas; and both of those distinctions
militate toward allowing contingent compensation in the former if it is to be
allowed at all. First, it is difficult to conceive how, in a pardon case, the
interests of attorney and prisoner-client could differ. The issue is
dichotomous-release is either granted or denied. In the tort case, on the
other hand, the attorney may be able to reap a greater remuneration by
choosing one course of conduct, such as quick settlement, rather than an-
other which is more favorable to his client.44 A second distinguishing con-
sideration is the object of the contract. On the one hand is the person for
whom justice, if not law, demands release, and on the other is the victim of
economic loss who is equally deserving of consideration. Certainly, to
make it more difficult for the man wrongfully confined than for the man
civilly wronged to secure counsel, simply because of the "governmental
action" label, cannot be justified; yet Pennsylvania does just that.45
There appears to be neither logical nor binding doctrinal reason why
mere contingency should render a contract void where an attorney has
4 2 While there can be no rational argument as to the comparative honesty of one
branch of government against another, the assumption that the executive department's
safeguards against corruption are somewhat less effective than those of the judiciary
may have some basis in fact. Also to be contended with is the traditional American
distrust of "politicians" and "politics" as contrasted with esteem for the judiciary.
Any such distinction, however, has been rejected by the courts, at least for the pur-
pose of assessing contingent fee contracts whose objects are governmental action.
"There is no real difference in principle between agreements to procure favors from
legislative bodies, and agreements to procure favors . . . from the heads of depart-
ments." Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45, 55 (1864). See also Hazelton v.
Sheckells, 202 U.S. 71 (1905) (dictum). And a Kansas case stated that an attorney's
contract for purely professional services is enforceable whether the services are to
be rendered before "a court, a department of the government, or a legislative body."
McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kan. 692 (1879).
43 See Warnock v. Philadelphia Trust Co., 69 Pa. Super. 589 (1918) ; O'Hara
v. J. W. Rex Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 191 (C.P. 1958) ; Abrahams v. Epstein, 69 D. &
C. 238 (C.P. 1949). In these cases contingent fee contracts to influence governmental
action were upheld-a rarity in Pennsylvania. It is significant that in each of them
the success of the agent would result in the creation of a source of funds for his
remuneration. Warnock concerned the sale of land to a municipality; O'Hara like-
wise involved a sale to the government. And in Abrahams the agent sought to procure
for his principal the right to engage in a profit-making enterprise.
44 Assume a case in which the attorney's fee is 10% of the recovery. After five
days the attorney settles for $1000; his daily wage is $20 and his client recovers $900.
On the other hand, if there is no settlement and after twenty days a judgment for
$3000 is awarded, the attorney's daily wage is $15 but his client recovers $2700.
45 The considerations heretofore discussed also fail to justify a stricter rule when
dealing with persons attempting to place facts before a legislature than is applied to
someone seeking to state his claim before a court. Assume C has a claim against
the government which can be satisfied only through the enactment of a private bill.
Not being well versed in the ways of politics or of the law, C employs A, an attorney,
to draft the bill and to present and explain it to the proper committee; a contingent
fee contract is agreed upon. A is successful but C is ungrateful. A sues on the
contract. Cf. Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa. 375, 24 Atl. 219 (1892) (held unenforceable).
19601
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performed purely professional services in attempting to secure a pardon.
The equities of the situation seem to militate toward removing obstacles
from the path of the indigent prisoner who is in need of legal counsel to
regain his liberty. If improper action occurs or is contemplated, that in
itself will suffice to invalidate any contract, contingent or otherwise.
46
CORPORATIONS-MARET VALuE APPREciATION OP SToOK NOT
So SPECULATIVE A STANDARD FOp DETERMINING EXECUTIVE COM-
PENSATION AS TO BE A GIFT OF CORPORATE ASSETS
Defendant Koppers Company created a deferred compensation plan,
approved by the shareholders, whereby key employees who agreed to
remain in the corporation's employment for at least five years were as-
signed "units" of retirement income, the number of units being determined
by nonparticipating directors on the basis of their estimate of the indi-
vidual's value to the corporation. Upon a participant's termination of
employment by death, retirement or disability, the plan provided for pay-
ment to him of an amount equal to the advance in market price of one
share of defendant's common stock for each unit held, measured from
the time the unit was assigned until the termination of employment. At
such time each participant also was to receive an amount equal to the
dividends which he would have received during his period of participation
in the plan had he been the owner of one share of common stock for each
unit held.' The plan provided that no more than 100,000 units could be
outstanding at any one time, but a participant's termination of employment
released his units for possible reassignment to other employees. As a
reserve to cover the creation of these 100,000 units, 50,000 shares of de-
fendant's common stock were put aside. Plaintiff shareholder sued de-
rivatively, seeking the invalidation of the market price feature of the
plan and an injunction against issuance of further rights under the plan
except those relating to compensation measured by common stock divi-
dends. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.2  Rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the plan amounted to a
gift of corporate assets, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that apprecia-
tion in market value of the corporation's common stock was not too
speculative a standard to form a reasonable basis for determining com-
pensation and that the plan was not invalidated by any indeterminate lia-
bility to which the corporation might be subject because the plan, should
46 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
' The total amount of compensation accrued under this plan was payable over a
period of ten years in quarterly installments upon termination of the participants
employment. Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596, 598 (Del. 1959).2 Lieberman v. Koppers Co., 149 A.2d 756 (Del. Ch.), aff'd sub nor. Lieberman
v. Becker, supra note 1.
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it get out of hand, could be terminated at any time by the directors 3 or
the courts. In the meantime, the court observed, the reserve shares could
be sold to cover obligations arising under the plan.4 Lieberman v. Becker,
155 A.2d 596 (Del. 1959).
Corporate compensation arrangements for employees are vulnerable
to shareholder attack 5 and hence invalid unless the compensation granted
bears a reasonable degree of equivalence to the value of the service for
which it is given.6 However, the usual judicial attitude toward the appli-
cation of this rule was expressed in Heller v. Boylan:
7
"Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled
economic problems. . . . On this branch of the case, I find for the
defendants. Yet it does not follow that I affirmatively approve these
huge payments. It means that I cannot by any reliable standard find
them to be waste or spoliation. . . . [I]f a ceiling for these bonuses
is to be erected, the stockholders who built and are responsible for
the present structure must be the architects."
Although in Rogers v. Hill 8 it was held that the amounts actually dis-
bursed under a bonus plan based on a percentage of profits may be so large
as to render it invalid,9 such bonus plans presumptively satisfy the rea-
3 A reservation to the plan enabled the directors to terminate the plan at any
time; if this was done within five years of the effective date of the plan, no person
could be paid benefits under the market appreciation feature. Lieberman v. Becker,
155 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 1959). However, it is not reasonable to suppose that the
directors are in fact in a position to exercise this power in view of the morale problem
attendant upon an abolition of the important retirement rights conferred.
4 The 50,000 shares reserved under the plan could not, of course, cover the total
possible liability of the corporation arising from the issuance of 100,000 reassignable
units.
5 Approval by less than a unanimous vote of the stockholders is no bar to judicial
scrutiny of a corporate compensation plan where a charge of wasting corporate
assets has been made. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 91, 90 A.2d
660, 665, order amended for reargument, 33 Del. Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57, aff'd on rehearing,
33 Del. Ch. 283, 92 A.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582,
591-92 (1933) ; Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311, 314 (Del. Ch. 1956).
6 Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 90 (N.D. Ohio 1958) ; Kerbs v. Cali-
fornia E. Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652, 658 (Sup. Ct 1952). "The
reward, however, must have reasonable relation to the value of the services for which
it is given and must not be, in whole or in part, a misuse or waste of corporate funds,
or a gift to a favored few, or a scheme to distribute profits under a mere guise of
compensation, but in fact having no relation to services rendered. . . . [T]he com-
pensation must be in proportion to the executive's ability, services and time devoted
to the company, difficulties involved, responsibilities assumed, success achieved, amounts
under jurisdiction, corporation earnings, profits and prosperity, increase in volume
or quality of business or both, and all other relevant facts and circumstances . .. ."
Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 703, 273 N.Y. Supp. 87, 113-14 (Sup. Ct.
1934) (dictum).
729 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (Sup. Ct), aff'd mere., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d
131 (1941).
8289 U.S. 582, reversing 62 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1933) (affirming district court
dismissal on basis of prior opinion, 60 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1932)).
9 289 U.S. at 591. This case was a suit seeking the recovery of payments made un-
der a bylaw of the American Tobacco Company which allocated 10% of the corporate
profits as a bonus to the president and five vice-presidents of American Tobacco.
1960]
1068 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108
sonable relation test.10 In addition to cash bonuses, stock purchase and
stock option plans have been held valid means of executive compensation."
An example of the latter is Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co.,
12
in which a five year option given to employees to purchase shares in the
defendant corporation was held valid despite earlier intimations by the
court that there was insufficient relation between the services of optionee-
employees and the subsequent market value of the stock by which their
bonuses would be measured.' 3 Although there has been some dicta to the
effect that the principle of Rogers v. Hill, whereby a cash bonus plan may be
invalidated on the basis of the amount of compensation ultimately paid,
would be applicable to the appreciation of stock reserved under an option
plan,14 this rule has never been utilized to render option plans invalid.15
On the other hand, in the recent case of Berkwits v. Humphrey,16 a
federal district court invalidated at its inception the market appreciation
feature of a retirement plan similar to that in the instant case on the
ground that it bore no reasonable relation to the value of employee serv-
ices. The court stated that many factors besides employee zeal influence
stock market prices 17 and that the plan itself leads to an indeterminate
liability on the part of the corporation.'
8
Apparently reasonable when adopted in 1912, the bylaw, due to greatly increasing
profits, had resulted in the receipt by the president in 1930 of an amount five times
greater than his salary. The Supreme Court, reversing a judgment for the company,
quoted with approval Judge Swan's dissenting opinion below that such a bonus is
in reality a "gift in part," 289 U.S. at 591, quoting 60 F.2d 109, 113-14 (dissenting
opinion), and hence invalid. It was not the bylaw itself or the profit-bonus relation-
ship therein created that was attacked, but rather the amount disbursed under its
mechanical operation that rendered the plan invalid. Judge Swan termed the bonus-
salary ratio arising under this bylaw "prima fade unreasonable," and pointed out
that the usual judicial deference to directors' discretion in determining compensation
was not applicable inasmuch as the American Tobacco directors were not in 1930
exercising discretion, but merely relying on a bylaw to relieve them of that duty.
60 F.2d 109, 114 (dissenting opinion). Note that Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941), arose on the same
facts as Rogers v. Hill. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
10 289 U.S. at 591.
11 E.g., Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 224, 91 A2d 786, 793 (1952);
see 57 Mica. L. REv. 415, 416 (1959).
12 53 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
13 "The argument that the services of the optionees will tend to increase the
earnings of the company, and in turn the market value of the stock, ignores the numer-
ous and extraneous factors which experience has shown motivate fluctuation of prices
on the stock market, as well as the debt and capital structure of the defendant, which
would make the effect of increased earnings on the market value of the stock highly
dubious." Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125, 130, motion
to dissolve injunction denied, supra note 12 (former injunction did not cover new
plan).
14McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 654 (D. Md. 1939)
(dictum), aff'd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Epstein
v. Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (dictum).
15 See 49 COLUm. L. Rrv. 232, 236-38 (1949).
16163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
17 Id. at 90, 91.
'8 The court reached this conclusion even though, unlike the plan in the instant
case, a number of authorized but unissued shares equal to the number of units created
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Compensation measured by corporate earnings will be universally up-
held '9 unless the sums actually paid are shockingly large.20  But the
question as to whether the required "reasonable relation," found where
compensation is measured by corporate earnings, exists in the shadowy
correlation between employee zeal and stock market values is debatable
2 l
inasmuch as additional variables are present.22 It is true that by chance
the extraneous factors which affect the market may conspire with employee
zeal to produce that degree of market appreciation which will give rise
to disbursements under the plan which are, in fact, reasonable-that is,
those which the directors' reasonable determination would have decreed.
However, as demonstrated by Heller v. Boylan,23 the price which the
shareholders must pay to await this fortuitous result is the practical for-
feiture of all judicial control over wastage of corporate assets through
compensation plans.24 Further militating against extending to market
appreciation plans the initial validity accorded compensation measured by
profits is the fact that, although increased profits carry with them cor-
porate capability of paying larger bonuses, market appreciation-which
may result from investors discounting future prosperity in the nation or
in an industry-does not.25 It seems desirable to draw the line at bonus
compensation measured by corporate earnings and to hold that market
appreciation is presumptively unrelated to the value of employee services
and that compensation plans based thereon are invalid at their inception.
The admitted inability of the courts to determine, except in cases of gross
overpayment, the reasonableness of the amount of compensation actually
paid should encourage them to apply an ounce of prevention by way of a
by the plan were placed in reserve to cover disbursements. Id. at 85. One commen-
tator thought this feature should have been sufficient to save the plan in Berkwitz.
72 H Rv. L. Rav. 375, 376 (1958). See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
'9 See Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 263 App. Div.
815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941); Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 92 (N.D.
Ohio 1958) (dictum); Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125,
129-30 (dictum), motion to dissolve injunction denied, 53 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa.
1943) (former injunction did not cover new plan). Notice that the feature of the
plan in the instant case which provides for payment of an amount equal to common
stock dividends was not even challenged. Instant case at 598.
20 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
21 Compare 57 MIcH. L. Rav. 415, 417 (1959) and 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 147, 151
(1959), with 28 U. CINc. L. REv. 86, 93 (1959).
2 2 E.g., the investor's appraisal of the earning potential of the corporation and
the state of the industry, Federal Reserve Board policy and the general business out-
look, international financial stability, and even the health of the President of the
United States.
2329 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131
(1941).
24 See text accompanying note 7 .rupra. Cf. WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, COM-
PENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 413 (rev. ed. 1951).
25 See Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 90 (N.D. Ohio 1958). For a
discussion of H. J. Heinz Co. unit plan based on book value appreciation and its more
reasonable relation to employee services, see 47 CALIF. L. REv. 190, 193 (1959).
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stringent examination of the criteria by which compensation is measured.
And where directors in fact do not exercise their discretion as to the
amount of compensation paid but instead abandon their determination to
the operation of a mechanical standard, it would be anomalous indeed to
contend that the same deference paid to business judgment be accorded to
what is arguably its abdication.
26
The court in the instant case avoided the logical impact of the rea-
sonable relation test by reliance on the undisputed validity of stock option
plans. 27 However, in equating the "phantom stock" plan here involved
with stock options, the court overlooked an essential difference between
the two. When an employee receives an option or purchases stock re-
served for him, the corporation's total commitment has been satisfied
and no subsequent variable will increase its obligation. 28  The value of a
stock option may be ascertained 29 and its reasonableness judged by its
value when granted, without reference to subsequent market apprecia-
tion.30 The optionee will realize market appreciation, if any, from a pur-
chaser in the market at such time as he chooses to sell.31 Under the plan
in the instant case, however, the corporation has undertaken, not an obli-
gation to sell reserved shares at a stated price, but rather a liability to
pay an indeterminate amount of compensation at some future date.
3 2
Unlike stock option plans, the "unit" plan in the instant case cannot, as the
court tacitly admits,83 find its ultimate vindication by reference to reason-
ableness at the time of its inception. The court in Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 4
26 Cf. Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 114 (Swan, J., dissenting), which pointed out
that the usual rule of deference to business judgment need not apply where directors
rely on the mechanical operation of a bylaw to relieve them of that judgment See
note 9 supra.
27 Instant case at 600, 601.
28 "[Flailure to exercise [the option] . . . merely withheld from the company
the right and opportunity to use the proceeds of the option . . . . This would seem
to be the total extent of the interest of the company brought about by the delay in
executing the option." Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 351 (D. Del. 1948).
29 Note, 49 COLUm. L. Rxv. 232, 235 (1949).
30 See Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 350-51 (D. Del. 1948) ; Diamond v.
Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103, 116 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d
412 (1942), aff'd inem., 292 N.Y. 554, 54 N.E.2d 683 (1944). See notes 17 and 18
supra and accompanying text.
31 Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 92 (N.D. Ohio 1958). However, for
a suggestion that the corporation has in any event paid the accretion, see 47 CALU'.
L. REv. 190, 192-93 (1959). This reasoning may underlie implications in some cases
that excessive accretion would render a stock option plan invalid. See McQuillen v.
National Cash Register Corp., 27 F. Supp. 639, 654 (D. Md. 1939) (dictum), aff'd,
112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Epstein v. Schenck, 35
N.Y.S.2d 969, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (dictum).
32 Cf. Shelmerdine, Shadow Stock Deferred Compensation Arrangements, N.Y.U.
17TH INST. ON FED. TAX 933, 949 (1959). See also note 4 supra and accompanying text.
33 Instant case at 601. "[S]uch a reason would not seem to be sufficient in any
event to strike down a plan of compensation at the time of its institution." Ibid.
34 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958). The court in the instant case specifically
rejected the reasoning of Berkwitz. Instant case at 601.
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in striking down the "unit" plan there involved, recognized that some role
must be played in this area by the courts and that to ratify any mechanical
compensation formula selected by management, however distantly related
to the impact of employee services, is to abandon the only effective judicial
control in the field of corporate employee compensation-the insistence
upon a reasoned determination by the directors that payments made to
employees do not constitute a waste of corporate assets.
EVIDENCE-ATTORNEY 32 POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTS PREPARED
BY CL1IET-TAXPAYER'S AcCOUNTANT HELD UNABLE To lrvoKE
CONSTITUTIONAI PIvILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMImATION ON
BEHA.F OF CLIENT
For several years an accountant had retained possession of work papers
prepared in connection with his employment by taxpayer, until the latter
requested that the accountant turn them over to taxpayer's counsel.
Shortly thereafter, a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service served
taxpayer's counsel with a summons directing production of the work papers
then in his possession.3 Counsel refused, invoking on behalf of his client
the privilege against self-incrimination; the Service then petitioned the
district court that the attorney be ordered to comply with the summons.
2
Finding the papers to be the property of the accountant even though the
accountant filed an affidavit to the effect that he had relinquished all claim to
them, the court ordered production, holding that the attorney did not,
under these circumstances, have standing to invoke the privilege in his
client's behalf. United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.),
appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959).
The Internal Revenue Code provides for discovery of books, papers,
or other data relevant to the determination of any person's tax liability.
8
Limiting this broad discovery power, however, is the fifth amendment,
which gives to an individual a privilege against self-incrimination where he
might be subject to criminal liability; 4 the privilege extends to documents
1 The summons was issued pursuant to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
2 "If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify,
or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court
for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by
appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books,
papers, records, or other data." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(a).
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
4 "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . .." U.S. CONqST. amend. V. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 562-63 (1892). One cannot refuse to produce his records or testify if he cannot
show imminence of a criminal proceeding. McCoRmIcx, EVIDENCE § 128 (1954);
8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2254 (3d ed. 1940). Accordingly, the claim of privilege could
not be raised in answer to a § 7602 summons if only civil tax liability were involved.
Treasury officials have expressed the opinion that they could not successfully prosecute
a taxpayer if incriminating records were obtained from him by compulsion, and the
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as well as oral testimony.5 Some property interest in the requested material
is requisite to claiming this personal privilege; various courts espouse
standards of title or at least of rightful possession, 6 but without apparent
uniformity or articulated rationale.7 Work papers prepared by an ac-
manual of the Intelligence Unit directs that summons on the taxpayer should never
issue if there is the possibility of recommending criminal prosecution. Lipton, Record
Keeping and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, in N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED.
TAX 1331, 1337-38 (1956). Although Service policy prevents outsiders from examin-
ing the manual, the directive is still in effect. Interview With Internal Revenue
Service Counsel, in Philadelphia, Dec. 28, 1959. The court in the instant case appar-
ently assumed possible criminal liability and thus did not reach the question of whether
the documents would tend to incriminate the taxpayer.
5 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886) ; Application of House, 144
F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138
(W.D.N.Y. 1923); United States v. Vadner, 119 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1954). See
generally MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 2.04 (1959). Records required by law to
be kept are in some instances exempted from the fifth amendment privilege. Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), held that records required by the Price Control
Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 22, to be kept were not privileged. Several cases have
indicated approval of the doctrine in connection with income tax records. Falsone v.
United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); United
States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955). But see Beard v. United States,
222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955), where the government,
in opposing certiorari, argued that the required records doctrine was not in issue in
the case. The court denied certiorari and the opinion of authorities in the field is
that the Beard case has not extended the required records doctrine to income tax
records. Johnston, Self-Incrimination, Searches and Seizures, and Privileged Corn-
nunications in Tax Matters, in U. So. CAL. 1958 TAX INsT. 579, 588; Kostelanetz,
Bill of Rights Not Repealed for Taxpayers, 34 TAxEs 16 (1956). But even if the
no-privilege doctrine were to be applied to income tax records, it is at least doubtful
that work papers would be considered as required records under existing regulations.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) (1960).
6 See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), a leading authority on the
possession requirement, where the president of an unincorporated labor union unsuc-
cessfully refused to produce union records. The Court said by way of dictum that
the documents "which the privilege protects must be the private property of the
person claiming the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal
capacity." Id. at 699. In Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923), title to the records
of a bankrupt passed by operation of law to the receiver and, therefore, the bankrupt
could not claim the privilege against self-incrimination even though he still main-
tained physical possession. See also Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 101
(N.D. Cal. 1956) (White cited with approval) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 206-07
(1942); UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE 25(d). Cf. Wheeler v. United States, 226
U.S. 478, 490 (1913), where books and papers of a dissolved corporation in possession
of its former officers were held to be records of the corporation. However, in In the
Matter of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), the president and sole stock-
holder of a foreign corporation held the corporate books and was entitled to resist
production on grounds of self-incrimination because the firm never did business in
the United States. And in a recent case a subpoena directed to a corporation to
produce records belonging to an officer of the firm was quashed because only the
officer had access to the safe and, had the corporation delivered the safe to court,
the claimant himself would have had to open it. United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d
344 (2d Cir. 1959).
7 Compare the "title" language of Ex parte Fuller, supra note 6, with the "posses-
sion in a personal capacity" concept of United States v. White, supra note 6. How-
ever, while the courts speak in terms of "property," they do not analyze the elements
which comprise the possession necessary to support a claim of privilege under the
fifth amendment. It seems that, in order to sustain a claim of privilege, the document
must incriminate the person from whom it is sought, and that person must be in
rightful possession of the document. Thus, the legal owner of documents cannot inter-
pose a claim of privilege once he has been dispossessed of them. See Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918);
Lisansky v. United States, 31 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1929). Production can be enforced,
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countant in the course of his examination of his client's financial transactions
are traditionally the property of the accountant, are retained by him,8 and
are obtainable by proper demand for discovery in federal investigatory
proceedings, both civil and criminal, against the client.9 There may, how-
ever, be agreement that title or possession be relinquished by the ac-
countant,10 and whether such a transfer to the client will suffice for purposes
of the latter's assertion of the privilege has been determined on an ad hoc
basis.'1 Further complications arise when the papers are turned over to an
attorney in confidence inasmuch as no attorney-client privilege as such
obtains in the case of pre-existing documents ;12 but there is authority for
extending privileged treatment if the papers would have been so protected
in the absence of confidential privilege, from one in rightful possession even though
the documents might incriminate the true owner. See McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
90 (1906) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) : "It [the fifth amendment] was
never intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be in-
criminated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person." Cf. Dier
v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147 (1923). In addition to the requisite property interest, however,
there seems to be a requirement of self-creation of the incriminating material; of
this requisite the courts seem to have made little or no mention. See text accompany-
ing notes 23-28 infra.
To be compared with the above discussion is lack of privilege with regard to
blood tests, fingerprinting, photographing, and the like. The privilege is generally
denied in these areas because historically self-incrimination encompassed only testi-
monial compulsion (oral testimony and production of documents and other objects).
McCoRMIcK, op. cit. supra note 4, § 126. For an excellent discussion of the types
of disclosure protected by the privilege against self-incrimination, see MAGUIRE, op.
cit. supra note 5, § 2.04. See also MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE rule 205 (1942);
UNIORM RULES OF EvIDENcE 23(3), 25(b), 25(c). There is some limited authority
that the privilege is denied in such areas because there is no activity on the part of
the party, but rather an enforced passivity. See MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 4,
§ 126; Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 38-39
(1949).
8
STETTLER, AUDITING PRINCIPLES 80 (1956). See also KOHLER, AUDITING 13
(1947); PELOUBET, AUDIT WORKING PAPERS 2-4 (1937). Several states provide by
statute that working papers belong to the accountant unless there is an agreement
to the contrary. E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 5130 (express agreement) ; Mo. Rv.
STAT. § 326.100 (1949). The instant case arose in New Jersey which has no similar
provision.
9 Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
864 (1953). FEa. R. Civ. P. 43(a) states that the district court should follow the
statute or rule which favors the exception of the evidence from any privilege. FEa.
R. CRIm. P. 26 provides that privileges of witnesses are to be governed "except when
an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason
and experience." There is no accountant-client privilege at common law. See Sale
v. United States, 228 F.2d 682, 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956);
Falsone v. United States, supra at 739; 8 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2286.
But a few states have adopted such a privilege by statute. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 153-1-7(6) (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.15 (1952).
10 See note 8 supra.
11 Compare the cases cited in note 6 supra.
12 The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between
attorney and client See MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 93, 95; 8 WIGmoRE,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 2311. Pre-existing documents do not in themselves constitute
communications between client and attorney. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74
(1913) ; McCoRmicK, op. cit. supra note 4, § 93.
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while in the client's possession.13 The law is unclear both as to the
attorney's duty under summons to produce these documents and as to his
standing to claim the fifth amendment privilege in their regard on behalf
of his client.14
For purposes of assessing the property interest in the work papers,
the court in the instant case drew upon two cases involving basically similar
factual circumstances (that is, work papers initially in the possession of
the accountant transferred to client's attorney prior to summons upon the
attorney to produce) : Sale v. United States,15 which found that the papers
were the accountant's and therefore ordered production, and Application
of House,' which held that the property in the documents was in the tax-
payers and consequently refused to order production. Being undecided
whether the question of ownership was one of fact or of law,17 the court,
rather than weighing the facts before it, followed Sale primarily because
it was the decision of a higher court.' 8 By pursuing this course, however,
certain crucial aspects of Sale were overlooked. There it was an attorney-
client privilege that was being claimed and in that context the district court
found the papers to be the property of the accountant.19 But even more
disconcerting is the fact that Sale was merely an affirmance of a district
court's finding of fact,20 and although there was mention of conflicting
13 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2307. See Falsone v. United States, 205
F.2d 734, 738 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953) (dictum); Gretsky v.
Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914 (D. Mass. 1958); Edison Elec. Light Co. v. United States
Elec. Lighting Co., 44 Fed. 294, 297 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890) ; McCoassIcK, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 93.
14 Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-
incrimination was a personal privilege and that the witness could not invoke it to
protect some other person, even if the witness was an authorized agent of said person.
The witness in that case was a corporate officer, and the Court said that in some
cases counsel will not be allowed to make the objection. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
69-70 (1906) (dictum). In Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 822 (1949), an attorney who was not a witness was not permitted
to assert the privilege for his client after the client waived his privilege by volun-
tarily testifying. United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955), said
by way of dictum that an attorney could not refuse to produce his client's books in
his possession. Yet in Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956), the
attorney's possession was equated with that of the taxpayer and the privilege was
allowed. One court attempted to rationalize the differences in this manner: a witness
cannot refuse to answer by setting up the privilege of another; however, if he is a
duly authorized agent or attorney of the individual, he can assert the privilege for
his principal or client in appropriate circumstances-when the agent or attorney is
not called upon to respond to a question. Brody v. United States, 243 F.2d 378, 387
n.5 (1st Cir. 1957). Compare London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 Fed. 506
(1st Cir. 1910), where the court held that defendant's counsel could not invoke the
privilege for the treasurer of defendant corporation where the treasurer was a witness,
and Morgan v. Halberstadt, 60 Fed. 592 (2d Cir. 1894), where defendant's attorney
was refused permission to object, on grounds that it would incriminate the witness,
to questioning of the treasurer of defendant corporation.
15228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956).
16 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
17 Instant case at 890.
18 Ibid.
'o 228 F.2d at 686.
20 "'We are unable to say that the court's decision on this issue [property of the
work papers] was clearly erroneous." Ibid.
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evidence of ownership,21 that evidence is not detailed in the record and thus
was unavailable for consideration by the court in the instant case. On the
other hand, the instant case and House are identical as to the privilege
asserted and the procedural setting. But this is not to infer that adherence
to that case might not have been equally questionable inasmuch as, by
requiring mere indefinite possession in a personal capacity, House may have
gone too far in its "zealous protection of the liberties of the people.. . . " 22
The "rightful, indefinite possession" test does not give adequate scrutiny to
physical possession acquired through eleventh hour transfers, which should
not be sufficient for the invocation of the fifth amendment. And even more
important, it overlooks entirely the logical implication of the constitutional
privilege that one should have such an element of selfness with the creation
of the substance of the documents that it may be said to be his own incrim-
inating statement. Self-preparation and retention of one's documents would
obviously lend the identity necessary to raise the privilege. But where the
papers are the immediate product of another (for instance, one's account-
ant), the requisite identity must be determined by less evident factors:
possession depends upon whether there was an underlying intent that the
papers, prepared from the client's records and other data, were to belong to
the client; and self-creation depends on whether the resulting documents
contain so little original professional effort that they do not amount to the
statements of the preparer.23 An express agreement at the inception of the
accountant-client relationship whereby the papers were, upon production,
to become the property of the client would clearly satisfy the intent require-
ment.24  And even in the absence of such an express agreement, the
requisite intent might still be established where there had been a transfer
of papers from accountant to client; evidence of the time of transfer, in
relation to both the commencement of the accountant-client relationship and
the service of summons would be relevant. Thus, if the papers had re-
mained with the accountant from the outset of the employment relationship,
a transfer several years later 2 5 followed closely by a summons might sug-
gest, in the absence of other evidence, that the parties went through the
motions merely to avoid discovery. Under this line of analysis, and even
assuming that the self-creation element of identity is resolved in favor of
the taxpayer, it is suggested that the work papers in both House and the
21 Ibid.
22 144 F. Supp. at 103.
23 This last issue is one of degree-how much of the document is the product
of the mental processes of its producer, in this instance an accountant. A mere repro-
duction of the client's data in summary form would provide sufficient identity, whereas
a highly analytical statement probably lies at the opposite end of the scale.
24 Cf. Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956). It is possible
that an unethical individual may be able to avoid discovery merely by making a prior
arrangement, but because the great majority of transactions are legitimate, and because
there is great difficulty in ascertaining the intent of the parties, such an agreement
should be taken as prima facie evidence of ownership.
2 5 E.g., instant case (at least one year); Application of House, supra note 24
(eight years).
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instant case may not have been the property of the client for the purpose
of invoking the privilege against self-incrimination.
Assuming arguendo that the taxpayer can satisfy the requisites for
invoking the privilege, the further issue remains: should the taxpayer's
attorney in possession of such documents be allowed to invoke the privilege
on behalf of his client? It would seem only equitable that if the papers
would be privileged in the hands of the client, they should not lose this status
merely by reason of the client's yielding possession in confidence, so long as
the transfer does not constitute an attempt to evade discovery.26 Full dis-
closure to one's attorney is a cogent reason for maintaining the privilege;
it weighs strongly against any inconvenience to the party desiring inspec-
tion. Some courts have in fact displayed a willingness to protect other
confidences in the absence of the privilege-holder when the matter is brought
to the judge's attention.
2 7
One argument that has been made in favor of denying counsel the
standing to claim for his client the privilege against self-incrimination is
that, while the attorney-client privilege is aimed at preventing the disclosure
of confidential communications, the self-incrimination privilege is directed
at the means of inducing disclosure and therefore can be claimed only by
the person whose affairs are under investigation. 2  But House objected
to this onerous rule which would require the physical attendance of the
client at prolonged hearings and investigations--or, in the alternative,
waiver of the constitutional privilege.29 And in any event, such a rule
26 It is suggested that the only type of transfer supportable as being valid would
be one made in connection with some legitimate aspect of the attorney-client relation-
ship. Here the necessity for full disclosure upon which the attorney-client privilege
is based, see MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 4, § 92, and 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. Mipra
note 4, § 2291, affords a rationale not evident in other situations of confidence,
e.g., transfer to an accountant. The differing import of full disclosure-to an attorney
where one's personal liberty is at stake as opposed to his accountant who is primarily
concerned with the presentation of a true picture of business operations-supports
the distinction in maintaining the client's privilege against self-incrimination in the
former relationship though not in the latter, although in both cases the client expects
a high degree of confidence. But cf. Application of Ryan, 281 App. Div. 953, 120
N.Y.S.d 110 (1953), where the court held that "the possession by the accountant
of [the client's] personal records, including the accountant's work sheets based
thereon, is deemed to be, in law, possession by [the client] . . . himself. This relates
to [the client's] . . . right to invoke the constitutional protection against self-
incrimination, not to privilege between attorney and client." Id. at 953, 120 N.Y.S.2d
at 111. The dissenting opinion declared that "the privilege against self incrimination
does not extend to papers or things in the possession of any third person, absent any
confidential privilege." Ibid. However, this decision was reversed in 306 N.Y. 11,
114 N.E.2d 183 (1953), because the original decision in the Court of General Sessions
was not appealable, thus leaving the ruling of the General Sessions as the law of
the case.
27 E.g., People v. Horowitz, 70 Cal. App. 2d 675, 161 P.2d 833 (1945) (attorney-
client) ; O'Brien v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 Kan. 138, 197 Pac. 1100
(1921) (attorney-client); Chicago Great W.R.R. v. McCafferty, 178 Iowa 1147, 160
N.W. 818 (1917) (attorney-client). Cf. Ex parte Lipscomb, 111 Tex. 409, 239 S.W.
1101 (1922) (within court's discretion to disallow attorney the right to invoke
attorney-client privilege for client). See McCoRmICK, op. cit. supra note 4, § 96;
8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2292.
28 Note, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 686, 691 (1930).
29 144 F. Supp. at 100.
RECENT CASES
would afford little practical advantage inasmuch as it is usually the attorney
who suggests and initiates the mechanism of objection.
A second distinction drawn to support the proposition that an attorney
cannot raise his client's fifth amendment privilege is grounded in the argu-
ment that the attorney-client privilege may be claimed because it is a com-
munication of which the attorney is fully apprised that is being protected;
on the other hand, the intimate facts which substantiate a claim of the self-
incrimination privilege may not be fully known or disclosed to the attorney.
Therefore, the argument concludes, the attorney should not be allowed to
claim the personal privilege.30 But whether the content of documents would
be incriminating is a question which the attorney is normally better able
to determine, because the client is often unaware of the true legal sig-
nificance of that content. Furthermore, extension of the client's privilege
to documents in the hands of his attorney may foster a more complete dis-
closure and, as a result, the attorney will be better equipped with facts to
claim the privilege for his client. Inasmuch as the cases which deny any
invocation of privilege in a representative capacity are of doubtful ap-
plicability,31 and inasmuch as self-incrimination is an area involving per-
sonal rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the benefit of doubt should be
resolved in favor of the privilege.
32
LEGISLATION-LinTATIoNs ON PowER oF STATES To TAX NET
INcoME DERIVED FROM INTERSTATE COMMERCE: P.L. 86-272
Responding to the impetus of recent Supreme Court action and in-
action relating to the power of the states to tax net income derived from
activities in interstate commerce,' Congress last year enacted Public Law
86-272,2 designed to immunize from such taxation certain persons and
businesses whose only income-producing contacts with the taxing state are
of a specified minimal nature.3 The act, regarded by its draftsmen as
30 See United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 367-68 (M.D. Ga. 1955). Note
that the attorney-client privilege is based on the sanctity of the relationship, and is
not dependent on the content of the communication. MCCORMICK, Op. Cit. supra note 4,
§§ 91-92; 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 2290-91.
31 Compare cases cited note 14 supra.
32 Ullnann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-29 (1956); Maffie v. United
States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95,
101-02 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
1 See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959) (Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc.); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 359 U.S. 28 (1959) (appeal dismissed and, treating
appeal papers as petition for certiorari, certiorari denied) ; International Shoe Co. v.
Fontenot, 359 U.S. 984 (1959) (certiorari denied).
273 Stat. 555, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 381-84 (Supp. 1959).
3 See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
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temporary legislation, 4 also directs the House Committee on the Judiciary
and the Senate Committee on Finance to conduct a complete study of the
state taxation problem and to report their results together with legislative
recommendations.
SETTING FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
State taxation of persons and businesses engaged in interstate com-
merce has been one of the most prolific sources of Supreme Court litiga-
tion; 5 unfortunately this litigation has not, as a general rule, produced
rationally consistent results.6  However, despite frequent inconsistencies,
and notwithstanding statements that opinions in the interstate taxation field
must be read with special regard to the particular factual situation in-
volved, 7 several principles governing state power in the area have appeared
in Supreme Court opinions with varying degrees of regularity. First, the
Court has generally drawn a sharp distinction between cases involving state
taxes on gross income derived from interstate business and those concern-
ing levies on net income attributable to the same source, on the theory that
the former arise with each transaction in proportion to its magnitude and
therefore impose a "direct burden" on interstate commerce whereas the
latter arise only where the interstate transaction sought to be taxed results
in a profit and therefore burden the transaction only "indirectly." 8 Second,
4 The report of the Senate Finance Committee stated that "the bill . . . is not
a permanent solution to the problem that exists." S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1959). It should be noted, however, that no cut-off date is provided in the
statute itself.
5 "The Supreme Court has handed down some 300 cases dealing with [state
taxation). . . ." 105 COXG. REc. 14989 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959) (remarks of
Senator Byrd).
6 Many commentators have pointed out that the Supreme Court's illogic in the
taxation cases results from an inclination to differentiate between the subject and the
measure of a challenged tax, with a coincident failure to consider the actual economic
consequences of its imposition. Professor Powell, for example, states that the "dif-
ferentiation between subject and measure often resulted in a discordance between
form and substance. Names were made to matter more than mathematics or economics.
Certainly the legal dogma that the states may not tax interstate commerce did not
accurately convey the business fact. The pecuniary fruits of interstate commerce
might be taxed in some ways but not in others." Powell, More Ado About Gross
Receipts Taxes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 501, 502-03 (1947). See also Barrett, "Substance"
vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 740 (1953); Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: An Appraisal
and Suggested Approach, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 233.
7 "The history of this problem [state taxation of interstate commerce] is spread
over hundreds of volumes of our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been
said in the past would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the future.
Suffice it to say that especially in this field opinions must be read in the setting of the
particular cases and as the product of preoccupation with their special facts." Free-
man v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
8 The Court's most pointed statement of this distinction is found in United States
Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918), at 328-29: "The difference in
effect between a tax measured by gross receipts and one measured by net income
is manifest and substantial, and it affords a convenient and workable basis of
distinction between a direct and immediate burden upon the business affected and a
charge that is only indirect and incidental. A tax upon gross receipts affects each
transaction in proportion to its magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable
or otherwise. Conceivably it may be sufficient to make the difference between profit
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the Court, while sustaining various applications of state taxes imposed
directly on net income, has struck down privilege or franchise taxes
measured by net income on the theory that a state cannot tax the privilege
of engaging in purely interstate commerce within its jurisdiction.9 Third,
while insisting that net income taxes upon persons and businesses engaged
in interstate commerce be properly apportioned so as to tax only that por-
tion of the income reasonably attributable to the taxing jurisdiction, the
Court has not, as a general rule, critically examined the apportionment
formulas of the state net income taxes which it has considered.'0 And
fourth, the Court has consistently struck down state taxes where the effect
and loss, or to so diminish the profit as to impede or discourage the conduct of the
commerce. A tax upon the net profits has not the same deterrent effect, since it does
not arise at all unless a gain is shown over and above expenses and losses, and the
tax cannot be heavy unless the profits are large." On this theory, the application of
an Indiana gross receipts tax to receipts of sales made by an Indiana corporation out-
side the state was held invalid under the commerce clause, J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938), while the application of a Wisconsin net income tax to
net receipts derived from sales made to out-of-state customers by a domestic corpo-
ration was sustained, United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek 247 U.S. 321
(1918). While the rationale of the Adams-Oak Creek distinction has not been dis-
carded, inroads into its contemporary validity have been made by cases sustaining
taxes on various "local incidences" of interstate transactions where such taxes were
measured by gross receipts. See Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S.
534 (1951) (Illinois retailers' occupation tax measured by gross receipts sustained as
applied to foreign corporation); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.,
309 U.S. 33 (1940) (sales tax); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250 (1938) (privilege tax measured by gross receipts from sale of advertising).
9 The Supreme Court's distinction in this area is based upon the "operating inci-
dence" of the tax and is forcibly illustrated by Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602 (1951). There the Court held invalid, as applied to a trucking company
carrying on no intrastate hauling, a Connecticut tax on the privilege of doing business
within the state, the tax measured by the net income of the company reasonably
attributable to its activities within the state. "This Court heretofore has struck down,
under the Commerce Clause, state taxes upon the privilege of carrying on a business
that was exchsively interstate in character. The constitutional infirmity of such a
tax persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned to business done within the state."
Id. at 609. Note that, applying the doctrine of Northwestern-Stockham, discussed
infra note 14 and accompanying text, it seems that the tax would have been upheld
had it been imposed directly on net income. Assuming that Connecticut's apportion-
ment formula was reasonable, it appears that Spector's activities within Connecticut
would have supplied a sufficient nexus to support the imposition of such a tax: the
company leased and operated truck terminals in New Britain and Bridgeport, main-
tained bookkeeping staffs at both offices, and maintained and paid a sales staff at its
New Britain office. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 47 F. Supp. 671,
673 (1942); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 45-46, 61 A.2d 89,
93-94 (1948). Compare ET & WNC Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d
403 (1958), aff'd per curium, 359 U.S. 28 (1959), where a foreign motor carrier
corporation doing exclusively interstate business was held subject to North Carolina's
net income tax, even though it had no offices within the state except those which were
incident to and necessary for its interstate operations.
10 The Court has generally been inclined to accept the state's method of appor-
tionment of net income, placing the burden on the taxpayer to show that "the method
. . . adopted by the State was inherently arbitrary, or that its application to this
[taxpayer] . . . produced an unreasonable result." Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920). Such a burden is usually difficult to sustain.
See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682 (1936)
(burden not sustained where, under line mileage allocation formula, evidence showing
relatively expensive operation of lines within state was unaccompanied by proof
that such lines did not produce correspondingly high revenue); cf. Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924) (burden not sustained by
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of such levies was to discriminate against interstate business in favor of
local activities.1 '
While previous treatment of tax cases had generated comment from
some sources urging congressional action in the interstate taxation field,
12
showing that business in taxing state during the preceding year yielded no net income
where tax was for privilege of doing business during ensuing year). But see Hans
Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931) (burden
sustained by showing that percentage of income attributable to state was 17% where
apportionment formula was applied so as to attribute 66% to 85% of net income to
taxing state).
The possibility of a single corporation, doing business in several states, being
forced to pay net income taxes on more than 100% of its income is not an unreal
one. For example, where a consumer state apportions net income on the basis of
gross receipts while a manufacturing state uses a cost-of-manufacturing factor in
its apportionment formula, a corporation manufacturing its products in the latter and
selling them in the former might well be taxed twice on the same income. A survey
of 34 states using apportionment formulas with regard to net income taxes or taxes
measured by net income shows that seventeen states use a property-payroll-sales
formula or a close variation thereof (see CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 12-218 (Supp.
1959); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(7) (Supp. 1958); HAwAII Rzv. LAws
§ 121-4(3) (Supp. 1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3027(d) (Supp. 1959); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 141.120(4) (1959); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:245(F) (Supp. 1959); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 81, §316(b) (1957); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 63, § 38(2) (1953);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §290.19(2) (Supp. 1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 84-1503
(Supp. 1959) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-6 (Supp. 1959) ; N.Y. TAX LAws § 210(3) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420n-2(c) (Supp. 1958); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-11-14
(1956); S.C. CODE §§ 65-279.6-.10 (Supp. 1959); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-20 (6)
(Supp. 1959); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5903 (1959)); four states use a property-
cost of manufacturing-sales formula (see KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3218(c) (Supp.
1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §878(g) (1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2707
(1955); WiS. STAT. ANN. §71.07(2) (1957)); three states use a property-sales
formula (see CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §138-1-28(2) (1953); N.D. REv. CODE
§ 57-3812(3) (1943); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-131.1 (1950)); two states use the single
factor of gross sales (see IowA CODE ANN. §422.33(1) (1949); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 143.040(2) (1952)) ; eight others use miscellaneous formulas or require by statute
that the tax commissioner prescribe a formula (see ALA. CODE tit. 51, §402(13)
(Supp. 1951); ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. §48-10-5(C)(2) (Supp. 1958); ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §43-135(g) (2) (1956) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. §84-2020(3) (b) (1947) ;
CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §25101 (Supp.); D.C. CODE ANN. §47-1580(a) (1951);
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3113 (Supp. 1958) ; MIsS. CODE ANN. § 9220-12(1) (c) (Supp.
1958)). Additional variation among the states is created by the fact that their
common terms, e.g., "sale," are differently defined by different states. For a more
extended discussion of allocation formulas and the problems raised thereby, see Dane,
Breck and Panhandle; Impracticability of Judicial Standards for Interstate Taxation,
8 J. TAXATION 278 (1958) ; Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Corporate Income for
State Tax Purposes: Natura non Facit Saltuin, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 84 (1957); Wilkie,
Uniform Allocation of Income from Unitary Business, 37 TAXES 437 (1959).
11 On the ground that the tax in question discriminated against interstate com-
merce in favor of intrastate business, the Court, in Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327
U.S. 416 (1946), struck down a Richmond license tax on solicitors, stating at 429:
"In addition to [the possibility of striking more heavily upon out-of-state sellers],
the Richmond tax imposes substantial excluding and discriminatory effects of its own.
As has been said, the small operator particularly and more especially the casual or
occasional one from out of the State will find the tax not only burdensome but pro-
hibitive, with the result that commerce is stopped before it is begun. And this effect
will be extended to more substantial and regular operators, particularly those whose
product is of a highly limited or special character and whose market in any single
locality for that reason and others cannot be mined more than once in every so often."
See also Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952)
(Mississippi "privilege tax" on persons soliciting business for laundries not licensed
in the state held invalid as discriminating against interstate commerce).
12 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 6, at 789-91; Braden, Cutting the Gordian Knot
of Interstate Taxation, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 57 (1957).
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little pressure developed within Congress itself. The primary stimulus for
federal legislation was the Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. Stockham Valves
& Fittings, Inc.,13 two cases decided in a single opinion early in 1959.
In the Northwestern case, the taxpayer, an Iowa corporation manufacturing
and selling cement, made forty-eight per cent of its sales to dealers in Min-
nesota; its activities within Minnesota consisted of regular and systematic
solicitation of sales by four salesmen and the leasing of an office through
which solicited orders were transmitted to the home office for approval. In
the Stockham case, taxpayer was a Delaware corporation with its principal
office in Alabama; it sold its products through wholesalers who carried
other products in addition to those of taxpayer. The corporation main-
tained a sales-service office in Georgia and one salesman conducted regular
solicitation of orders throughout the state. In an opinion by Mr. Justice
Clark, the Court held that the application of the Minnesota and Georgia
net income taxes to the respective taxpayers did not violate the commerce
and due process clauses, saying that "net income from the interstate opera-
tions of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation provided
the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities
within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the same." 14
Additional congressional support for legislation was engendered when the
Court dismissed the appeal and (treating the appeal papers as a petition
for certiorari) denied certiorari in Brown-Fornan Distillers Corp. v. Col-
lector of Revenue,15 and subsequently also denied the writ in International
Shoe Co. v. Fontenot,1 both Louisiana cases. In the former, the Louisiana
Supreme Court 17 upheld the imposition of that state's net income tax 18
upon a foreign corporation where the only activities of the corporation
within Louisiana were the presence of so-called "missionary men" who
called on wholesalers and accompanied the wholesalers' representatives to
retail establishments in order to obtain suitable displays for the corpora-
tion's products. In the latter case,'1 the imposition of the tax was upheld
where the taxpayer's sole activities within the state consisted of the regular
and systematic solicitation of orders for its product by fifteen salesmen. In
13 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
14 358 U.S. at 452.
15 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
10 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
17 The opinion below is found at 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958).
18LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:241-:249 (1950), as amended, LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§47:242-:248 (Supp. 1959).
19 The opinion below is found at 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1959). In both
the Brown-Forman and International Shoe cases, the Louisiana court relied on its
previous decision in Fontenot v. John I. Hay Co., 228 La. 1031, 84 So. 2d 810 (1955),
where it was held that the state could tax the net income attributable to Louisiana
of an interstate carrier which maintained an office and had employees within the state
and which carried commodities through the state, although none of its shipments
originated or terminated in Louisiana.
1960]
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neither case did the taxpayer corporation maintain an office within the
taxing state.
Three states almost immediately after the Northwestern-Stockham
decision amended their taxation legislation to take advantage of sources of
revenue previously regarded as unavailable to them.20 Against this back-
ground of judicial decision and state legislative action, the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance, on August 11, 1959, reported the bill which was to
become P.L. 86-272. Amendments in the course of passage, however, sig-
nificantly diluted the initially intended effect of the legislation.
THE STATUTE
Provisions of P.L. 86-272
The statute as ultimately enacted provides that no state shall have
power to levy a net income tax on income derived within the state by any
person from interstate commerce where the only business activities of such
person within the state are:
"(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative,
in such State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are
sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are
filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in
such State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer
of such person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable
such customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders
described in paragraph (1)." 21
The limitations on the state taxing power do not apply where a cor-
poration is incorporated under the laws of the taxing state 22 or where
an individual is domiciled in or a resident of the taxing state.P Title II
of the statute directs the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on the Judiciary to "make full and complete studies of all
matters pertaining to the taxation by the States of income derived . . .
from . . . interstate commerce" and to report the results of such studies,
together with legislative proposals providing uniform standards for state
taxation, to their respective Houses before July 1, 1962.
20 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3025 (Supp. 1959) (net income tax replacing privi-
lege tax imposed by Idaho Laws 1933, ch. 159, § 11, at 255); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 67-2725 to -2727 (Supp. 1959) (tax on receipt of net earnings in Tennessee);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-13-65 to -72 (Supp. 1959) (tax on net income).
2173 Stat. 555, 15 U.S.C.A. §381(a) (1), (2) (Supp. 1959).
2273 Stat. 555, 15 U.S.C.A. § 381(b) (1) (Supp. 1959).
2373 Stat. 555, 15 U.S.C.A. § 381(b) (2) (Supp. 1959). The statute also con-
tains provisions prohibiting the assessment of net income taxes after its date of enact-
ment for taxable years ending on or before such date, but validating collections of
taxes imposed for years ending before such date and allowing collections where the
assessment was made for taxable years ending before the statute was enacted. 73 Stat.
555, 15 U.S.C.A. § 382 (Supp. 1959).
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Impact of the Statute
The bill as reported out of the Senate Finance Committee was ex-
pressly designed to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern-
Stockham.24  Included was a section providing that the immunity from
state taxation of a foreign entity engaged in interstate commerce was not
lost where, in addition to the solicitation of orders described in the statute
as enacted, the entity maintained an office within the taxing jurisdiction
primarily for the purpose of serving persons engaged in such solicitation. 25
This latter section was deleted by amendment during the bill's passage,
6
the effect of the deletion being to leave the Court's decision on the facts of
Northwestern-Stockham untouched.2 7 Only the potential broad reach of
the Northwestern-Stockham language,28 which could be read as covering
such situations as Brown-Forman and International Shoe, has been curbed.
The terms of the statute as finally passed speak directly to International
Shoe; and while not specifically directed to the facts of Brown-Forman, the
philosophy behind the statute makes it highly unlikely that promotional
activities similar to those of Brown-Forman's nonsoliciting "missionary
men" would subject a corporation to permissible state taxation. Congress
has, in the exercise of its commerce power, undertaken to define that which
is not a "sufficient nexus to support the [tax] ." 29 The committee reports 30
and the debates on the floor of the Senate 3 1 make clear that the act is an
attempt to formulate a standard of minimally requisite contacts for purposes
of net income taxation. The prohibitions which it expressly sets out, there-
fore, contain by clear implication a proscription of taxation where the
activities giving rise to the tax fall short of the degree of connection
exemplified by those categorized in the statute; and where the contact be-
24 See 105 CONG. REc. 14990 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959) (remarks of Senator
Saltonstall) ; id. at 14994 (remarks of Senator Talmadge) ; id. at 14995 (remarks of
Senator McCarthy).
23 See S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959).
26 See 105 CONG. REc. 15099-107 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959).
2 7 The fact of proposal and deletion of the sales-office section effectively fore-
closes any argument which might otherwise have been made that the statute as passed
by Congress impliedly prohibits taxation where an office is maintained within the taxing
state for the sole purpose of implementing salesmen engaged in the solicitation of
orders in the manner prescribed in the final bill. Absent this element of legislative
history, it could tenably have been contended that the maintenance of an office solely
incidental to the immunized solicitation did not constitute such an added point of
connection between the state and the taxpayer as would support the imposition of
the tax.
23 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
2 9 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452
(1959).
30 "[B]usinesses, particularly small- and medium-sized businesses, may be hesi-
tant to develop new markets in some States by extending their solicitation activities
to such States . . . should mere solicitation of orders be regarded as a local activity
forming a sufficient 'nexus' with the State ... " S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1959).
31 See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 15013 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959) (remarks of Senator
Javits) ; 105 CONG. REc. 15101 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959) (remarks of Senator Tal-
madge); id. at 15107 (remarks of Senator Kerr).
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tween the taxed enterprise and the taxing jurisdiction on which the tax is
alleged to rest is a contact other than the solicitation of orders in the
manner prescribed, the question which the courts must face is whether the
activities in question constitute a connection less significant, in the tradi-
tional due process sense, than mere solicitation. Clearly, the activities of
the Brown-Forman "missionary men" would fall on the nontaxable side
of the congressional minimum standard, lacking as they do the element of
active solicitation of income-producing contracts.
The minimum standard prescribed by Congress applies, however, only
to those businesses whose activities in interstate commerce include the
sale of tangible personal property within the taxing state. Sellers of
services are not protected,32 and the chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee expressly disclaimed any purpose to immunize by the statute busi-
nesses whose activities consisted of the solicitation of orders for the sale
of intangibles such as insurance,3 3 stocks and bonds.34 Presumably; then,
the taxation of business dealing in other than tangible personal property
remains dependent upon such court-developed standards as may follow in
the wake of Northwestern-Stockham.
Efficacy of the Statute
Much of the pressure for congressional action to restrict state taxing
power seems to have been generated by the fears of small and medium-
sized business interests that subjection to and compliance with the multiple
obligations of the state taxation systems would impose a repressive, if not
prohibitive, burden upon their engaging in interstate commerce. Yet the
essential objection of those groups, an objection sounded by the dissent in
Northwestern-Stockham 35 and frequently echoed in the subsequent debates
on the floor of Congress,3 6 is one which the stopgap legislation does not
face frontally-that small business, as against large business, is peculiarly
3
2 Consider, for example, the solicitation involved in Memphis Steam Laundry
Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
33 See 105 CONG. REc. 14991 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959) (discussion between Sena-
tors Byrd and Lausche).
34 Cf. DuPont v. Moore, 86 N.H. 254, 166 Atl. 417 (1933) ; People ex rel. Ter-
minals & Transp. Corp. of America v. State Tax Comm'n, 254 N.Y. 401, 173 N.E.
562 (1930).
35 "iT]here are thousands of relatively small or moderate size corporations doing
exclusively interstate business spread over several States. To subject these corpo-
rations to a separate income tax in each of these States means that they will have
to keep books, make returns, store records, and engage legal counsel, all to meet the
diverse and variegated tax laws of forty-nine States, with their different times for
filing returns, different tax structures, different modes for determining 'net income,'
and different, often conflicting, formulas of apportionment. This will involve large
increases in bookkeeping, accounting, and legal paraphernalia to meet these new de-
mands. The cost of such a far-flung scheme for complying with the taxing require-
ments of the different States may well exceed the burden of the taxes themselves,
especially in the case of small companies doing a small volume of business in several
States." 358 U.S. at 474.
36 See, e.g., 105 CONG. Rac. 15109-10 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959) (remarks of
Senator Neuberger). And see note 30 supra; note 37 infra.
RECENT CASES
hampered by the accounting and bookkeeping burdens of complying with the
varying state schemes which apply different allocation and apportionment
formulas.37 Of course, the statute does obviate the problems of compliance
with respect to that undetermined segment of business which it immunizes
altogether from taxation by nondomiciliary jurisdictions. But for the
undoubtedly large number of others whose patterns of operations will
not conveniently coincide with the rigidly prescribed congressional
minima, the fact remains that amenability to varying apportionment for-
mulas can result in taxation of more than one hundred per cent of net
income and that-apart from the tax assessment itself-such amenability
is costly in administrative expenses. Congress, finally impelled to recogni-
tion of the multistate taxation problem in the guise of the solicitation cases,
seems (at least provisionally) rather to have concerned itself with the
incident of solicitation than with the fundamental problem which those
cases reveal.
The probable effect of this solicitation approach on those small busi-
nesses at whose insistence action was taken is at best questionable. Since
the denial of the power to tax is not predicated upon the volume of business
done or the size of the business doing it 38 but rather upon the method by
which it is done, the operation of the legislation to afford relief to small
business in particular is dependent upon the unproved assumption that
small business is more likely than large business to carry on its interstate
trade by means of the solicitation of sales away from home. But even if
this assumption were valid for commercial practices before the enactment
of the statute, potential changes under the influence of the statutory pro-
tection itself would have to be considered. Large business' financial
strength alone might enable it to benefit from that protection to a greater
extent than would be possible in the case of small business. Large business,
operating on a national scale, may be able to concentrate its manufacturing
and warehousing activities within net-income-tax-free states and to carry
on its distribution activities, merely by solicitation, in a wide range of states
which do impose a tax, while competing small business, lacking the capital
for either relocation or for more than restricted regional expansion, has
less freedom to maneuver among the state tax systems. And although
those small businesses which carry on interstate sales activities through
solicitation are immunized from taxation by the statute, small business which
operates only on an intrastate basis may now have to compete with larger
37 See S. R P,. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (1959) ; 105 CONG. REc. 14998-99
(daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959) (remarks of Senator Keating); id. at 15020 (remarks of
Senator Kerr),; 105 CONG. REc. 15097 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959) (remarks of Senator
Sparkman) ; id. at 15113, 15114; 105 CONG. REc. 16215-16 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1959)
(letters to Senator Wiley).
3 8 An amendment proposed by Senator Long, which would have limited the
exemption from taxation granted by the statute to businesses which had sales within
the taxing state of a dollar volume less than the amount determined by multiplying
the state's population by 50 cents, was defeated. See 105 CONG. REc. 15125-31 (daily
ed. Aug. 20, 1959).
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concerns operating interstate on an unequal footing: the state may tax the
intrastate business but is prohibited from imposing a similar, properly
allocated, nondiscriminatory tax on the interstate business so long as the
latter's only activities within the taxing jurisdiction are the solicitation of
orders as defined in the statute. Moreover, the very fact that the "suffi-
cient nexus" concept has been legislatively fixed and tacked down to a
single-element standard of prescribed form may work to the advantage of
large, as opposed to small, business. Under the flexible case-by-case
analysis of contacts developed by the courts, elements such as gross volume
of business done in a state, or percentage of a corporation's activity center-
ing in a state,3 9 might have taken on significance for purposes of determin-
ing the state's power to tax, and large business thus been placed in a
position of special vulnerability. Indeed, it is significant that only with
what was feared to be the abandonment of virtually all federal limitations
on state taxation in 1959-a development that would put small and large
business on a par for vulnerability-was the pressing need to protect small
business felt. But within the provisions of a statute which extends im-
munity to a class defined in terms of form of activity carried on, large
business which elects to adopt and retain that form can expand to the
full extent to which its resources make the form practicable without fear
of subjection to nondomiciliary taxes.
Of course, the ostensibly temporary and therefore unstable nature of
the statute will no doubt tend to forestall any major adaptation of com-
mercial enterprises for purposes of tax planning under its shelter. Never-
theless, even as a makeshift measure pending further study, the legislation
does not seem to represent the most efficacious resolution to the conflict of
the states' need for revenue with the federal interest in the conduct of
unimpeded interstate trade. Intended as it is to restore the somewhat
uncertain status quo ante of a given (and seemingly fortuitous) point in
the development of a judicial doctrine, the statute's isolation of the solicita-
tion notion at once incorporates much of the underlying illogic of the judicial
treatment to date and hardens that illogic beyond the power of judicial
alteration. By asking the question, who shall be subject to an unbearable
situation, instead of how shall the situation be made generally bearable, it
works to deprive the states of a needed source of funds 40 without promoting
a correspondingly significant benefit to the free flow of commerce among
the states, or even securing the commercial position of the special class
whose interests, apparently, the statute was intended to protect. True, the
act is provisional, and is meant to govern a period of study into more
89 Note, e.g., that the taxpayer in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), was a corporation making 48% of its sales in Minne-
sota. While, of course, percentage of sales is not the Courtfs only criterion, or even a
specifically enunciated one, such a factor would seem to be relevant in determining
whether or not a "sufficient nexus" is present.
40 The measure was opposed by nearly all the tax and revenue departments of
the states. See 105 CONG. REc. 15132 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959) (remarks of Senator
Long).
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effective alternatives. But 'why, during that period, should the law be
fixated at a place of recognizedly unsatisfactory results? If Northwestern-
Stockharn pointed up a problem, it was only incidentally that of the solicit-
ing sales concern; more basically it was the problem of all interstate
business. Why not, in the interval of study, allow the congressional
investigators the benefit of whatever new solutions the Court itself might
find in pursuit of the implications of its recent actions? 41
In any event, it seems clear that the interim statute cannot be regarded
as a possible paradigm for permanent legislation. The fundamental need
is for congressional action in another dimension: for federal provision of a
uniform system of allocation and apportionment of permissibly taxable
income of interstate business among the several taxing jurisdictions. The
primary advantage of this mode of resolution is that it would not narrow
the taxing authority of the states by wholly depriving them of sources of
revenue, but rather would merely channel the exercise of that authority by
confining it to income attributable to the taxing jurisdiction under the
uniform formula. The adoption of such a unitary measure would insure
that no more than one hundred per cent of any taxpayer's net income is
subjected to state taxation and would reduce the costs of accounting now
made necessary by varying state allocation and apportionment systems. If,
in addition to the prescription of a uniform formula, Congress wished to
exempt certain activities altogether from state taxation, it could then do
so; but by legislating the exemption alone, Congress would allow con-
siderations which should be secondary to obscure the primary problems.
4 1 
It seems clear that under the rule of Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant,
257 U.S. 282 (1921), the Court could not long have avoided further spelling out the
ramifications and consequences of the Northwestern-Stockham decision. Artful plead-
ers, by attacking state taxing statutes as applied, could have brought themselves
within the appeal jurisdiction of the Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1958), and forced the
issue as to how far state taxing power under Northwestern-Stockhan extended, and
how closely the Court would have been inclined to scrutinize state allocation formulas
under the pressure of a less limited state authority to reach out-of-staters.
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